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INTRODUCTION
In early August of 2013, Jay Bilas—ESPN basketball analyst,
lawyer, and frequent National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) critic—sent a series of tweets with pictures of screenshots
from ShopNCAASports.com.1 Bilas used the website’s search func-
tion to look up the names of prominent NCAA Division I football
players. For instance, Bilas searched “Clowney” and University of
South Carolina football jerseys with the number seven appeared.2
Number seven just happened to be star defensive end and future
number one overall NFL draft pick, Jadeveon Clowney.3 Bilas
repeated the process using the names Johnny Manziel, Tajh Boyd,
Teddy Bridgewater, Braxton Miller, Denard Robinson, Everett
Golson, and Tyrann Mathieu.4 Within minutes the NCAA removed
the search function from the website.5 Within days the entire
ShopNCAASports.com website was shut down, later to be put back
up selling only NCAA championship merchandise.6 NCAA President
Mark Emmert commented, saying, “In the national office, we can
certainly recognize why [the sale of that merchandise] could be seen
as hypocritical, and indeed I think the business of having the NCAA
selling those kinds of goods is a mistake, and we’re going to exit that
business immediately.”7
According to its own Division I Manual, the NCAA’s Principle of
Amateurism is that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an in-
tercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated pri-
marily by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits
to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
1. Chris Greenberg, Jay Bilas Tweets ShopNCAASports.com Search Results, Embarrass-
es NCAA, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
08/06/jay-bilas-ncaa-twitter-jerseys-search_n_3715373.html [http://perma.cc/89BH-Q4WB].
2. Id.
3. See Jadeveon Clowney, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/player/jadeveon
clowney/2543456/draft [http://perma.cc/[5JRV-VC8E] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
4. Greenberg, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Mark Schlabach, NCAA Puts End to Jersey Sales, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2013, 1:10 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9551518/ncaa-shuts-site-jersey-sales-says-
hypocritical [http://perma.cc/S8DU-4W3C].
7. Id.
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avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploita-
tion by professional and commercial enterprises.”8 In contrast, the
NCAA had nearly $871.6 million in total revenue for the fiscal year
2011-2012.9 At the heart of the discrepancy between the NCAA’s
mission statement and its annual revenue is the debate about
whether big-time collegiate athletes should be compensated for the
use of their names, images, and likenesses. Legal academics10 and
the sports establishment have frequently advocated for compensat-
ing student-athletes, which would alter the current NCAA amateur-
ism ideal.11 That position has only increased in popularity as the
NCAA’s annual revenue continues to rise.12 Bilas, in an interview
after his Twitter rant, stated that there is a tension between the
NCAA’s amateurism model and the NCAA’s current commercial
model.13 The NCAA is making money by licensing student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses, but restricting what the revenue
drivers, the student-athletes, can make.14 
Current NCAA bylaws restrict student-athletes from receiving
any compensation from their school or outside sources for use of
8. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N [NCAA], 2014-2015 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 2.9
(2014) [hereinafter 2014-2015 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL] (emphasis added).
9. Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/ finances/revenue [http://perma.
cc/J83L-MKHG] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
10. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 208 (1990); Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA
Regulation of “Big Time” College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th
Century Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 1, 7 (2000). 
11. See Steve Rushin, Inside the Moat Behind the Forbidding Façade of NCAA Head-
quarters, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 3, 1997, http://www.si.com/vault/1997/03/03/223392/
inside-the-moat-behind-the-forbidding-facade-of-ncaa-headquarters-the-very-people-who-
enforce-the-organizations-rigid-rules-also-question-its-godlike-powers-and-ultimate-mission
[http://perma.cc/P44V-QSTV] (quoting former NCAA executive director Cedric Dempsey as
saying that the inconsistency between paying coaches a lot and generating significant rev-
enue, but not paying athletes, was hard to explain); Phil Taylor, Players Have Rights, Too,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 23, 1992, http://www.si.com/vault/1992/11/23/127611/players-have-
rights-too-in-a-fanciful-locker-room-showdown-college-athletes-go-to-extremes-to-get-their-
due-from-the-ncaa [http://perma.cc/9LYT-28UV] (depicting a conversation where an NCAA
athlete describes unfair treatment of student-athletes).
12. Jeffrey J.R. Sundram, Note, The Downside of Success: How Increased Commercialism
Could Cost the NCAA Its Biggest Antitrust Defense, 85 TUL. L. REV. 543, 544-45 (2010).
13. Laura Keeley, A Q&A with Jay Bilas on the O’Bannon Case and the NCAA, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Aug. 7, 2013), http://perma.cc/MW57-D5SU.
14. Id. 
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their names, images, or likenesses.15 Schools are not permitted to
give student-athletes financial aid in an amount greater than a full
grant-in-aid.16 Additionally, the NCAA prevents an athlete from
receiving outside financial aid in an amount greater than the cost
of attendance.17 
The discussion about whether student-athletes should receive
compensation for use of their names, images, and likenesses was
thrust into the national spotlight following the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling in
O’Bannon v. NCAA.18 In O’Bannon, a group of current and former
big-time NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball players
brought a class action suit.19 The Complaint alleged that NCAA
rules that restrict elite Division I football and men’s basketball
players’ compensation violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.20 Judge Claudia Wilken, sitting for a bench trial, held that the
challenged NCAA rules unreasonably restrained trade in the mar-
ket for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by
NCAA Division I schools, that the NCAA’s proffered procompeti-
tive justifications supported the restraint, but that these justif-
ications could be achieved through less restrictive alternatives.21
Judge Wilken granted an injunction that prevented the NCAA from
enforcing any rules that prohibited member schools from offering
Division I football and men’s basketball recruits a share of the
revenue generated from their names, images, and likenesses.22 The
injunction also prohibited the NCAA from enforcing any of its rules
that prevented member schools from depositing a share of NCAA
licensing revenue in trust for Division I football and men’s basket-
15. 2014-2015 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 8, § 15 (compensation for use of
names, images, or likenesses not included in permitted financial aid category).
16. Id. (defining grant-in-aid as the cost of tuition, fees, room and board, and required
course-related books).
17. Id. (defining cost of attendance as a grant-in-aid plus transportation, supplies, and
other expenses related to attendance). Generally, the cost of attendance is a few thousand
dollars more than a grant-in-aid. 
18. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 963; see also infra Part I.A (discussing the Sherman Act). 
21. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
22. Id. at 1007-08.
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ball recruits.23 Schools could put a limited amount of money in trust
for each of their football and men’s basketball student-athletes,
which would be paid out to the athletes after they leave school.24
This landmark decision, which could have altered the shape of
collegiate athletics, was tempered by limitations in the injunction.
The injunction allowed the NCAA to continue capping the amount
of money recruits receive while in school at the cost of attendance.25
The injunction also allowed the NCAA to cap the amount of licens-
ing revenue paid to an athlete in trust at $5000 per year—in 2014
dollars.26 Despite what may be described as a win for student-ath-
letes, commentators have criticized the decision for not going far
enough. Michael McCann, sports legal analyst and New Hampshire
Law School professor, stated that Judge Wilken allowed the NCAA
to cap player pay for reasons “not entirely clear in her opinion.”27
McCann added that, “it is not readily apparent why it is unlawful
for the NCAA to ‘collude’ to cap at $0, but not at $5000.”28 Fellow
law professor and sports legal analyst Marc Edelman echoed
McCann’s opinion in the immediate aftermath of the decision.29 
Judge Wilken used antitrust law’s Rule of Reason analysis to
examine the NCAA’s restraint on student-athlete compensation.30
The Rule of Reason is the framework courts most often use to
analyze restraints challenged under the Sherman Act.31 Despite
holding that the NCAA’s limits on student-athlete compensation
restrained trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, Judge
23. Id. at 1008.
24. For example, a school could promise recruits that each year $4000 would be put in
trust. After the student leaves school, he would be entitled to $4000 multiplied by the number
of years he was in school.
25. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
26. Id.
27. Michael McCann, What Ed O’Bannon’s Victory over the NCAA Means Moving For-
ward, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2014/08/ 09/
ed-obannon-ncaa-claudia-wilken-appeal-name-image-likeness-rights [http://perma.cc/ 85YM-
DKJL].
28. Id.
29. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association : A Small Step Forward for College Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2343 (2014) (arguing the injunction
implemented was “limited and weak”). 
30. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 984-85.
31. See infra Part I.A.
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Wilken upheld the restraints—with some limitations—due to the
NCAA’s alleged procompetitive benefits.32 When courts perform the
Rule of Reason analysis, they are comparing an activity’s anticom-
petitive effects with its procompetitive justifications. Procompetitive
benefits, when accepted by the court, justify a restraint that would
otherwise violate the Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint on
trade.33 This Note focuses on Judge Wilken’s holding that the
restraints on student-athlete compensation were justified in part on
grounds that they improved the integration of athletics and aca-
demics.34 Judge Wilken undoubtedly held that the NCAA restrained
trade as defined by section 1 of the Sherman Act. She also held,
however, that integrating student-athletes into the broader
campus—thereby improving the academic product student-athletes
receive—was a procompetitive justification for the restraint.
The purpose of this Note is to argue that improving education
quality for student-athletes is not a procompetitive justification for
restraining trade, and thus Judge Wilken should have overruled the
NCAA’s limitations on pay in their entirety as to this procompetitive
justification and allowed schools to compensate athletes for their
names, images, and likenesses. Part I of this Note outlines the
relevant antitrust framework, and describes how the Supreme
Court has applied that framework to the NCAA in the past. Part I
concludes with the relevant portions of Judge Wilken’s ruling in
O’Bannon. Part II describes the analysis courts apply when deter-
mining whether a given restraint is justified by its procompetitive
benefits. Part II then analyzes how the Supreme Court has applied
that analysis to procompetitive claims similar to what the NCAA
32. See infra Part I.B.2-3. 
33. See infra Part II.A. 
34. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. Judge Wilken also ruled that increased fan interest
and demand for amateur collegiate athletics is a procompetitive justification for the restraint.
Although beyond the scope of this Note, past legal analyses suggest that this procompetitive
justification also fails. See Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague
Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51,
82 n.178 (2006) (noting that the NCAA has never proven that fans care about amateurism);
Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2659
(1996) (arguing that with widespread academic fraud and illicit booster payments, it is
unlikely any college athletics fan truly believes they are watching “normal” students compete).
There are ongoing lawsuits that seek both to bar any restraint on student-athlete compen-
sation and to attack this idea of amateurism. See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
2015] NCAA AND THE RULE OF REASON 681
argued in O’Bannon—namely that the restraint is necessary to
improve product quality. Part III applies the framework established
in Parts I and II to Judge Wilken’s determination that an improved
educational product is a procompetitive benefit that justifies the
challenged restraints on trade. This Note then concludes by briefly
describing what this analysis means for the NCAA moving forward.
Because Judge Wilken held that maintaining amateurism is also a
procompetitive benefit, this analysis will not be outcome determina-
tive in any future student-athlete compensation cases. Nevertheless,
it strikes at one of two accepted NCAA defenses in the O’Bannon
case and leaves the NCAA open to future antitrust challenges.
Multiple such challenges are already pending, and legal attacks on
currently accepted NCAA defenses threaten the current NCAA
structure. 
I. ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK AND THE NCAA 
A. Antitrust Framework
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.”35 To prevail on a § 1 claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that
the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under the per se rule
of illegality36 or the Rule of Reason analysis;37 and (3) that the
agreement affected interstate commerce.38 For purposes of the
O’Bannon case, elements one and three were satisfied and were
not at issue. The NCAA bylaws were a clear agreement that re-
stricted the amount of financial aid and money a student-athlete
could receive,39 and NCAA Division I collegiate athletics so clearly
affected interstate commerce that the point did not warrant further
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
36. See infra Part I.A.1 for an explanation of what actions are illegal per se.
37. See infra Part I.A.2 for an explanation of how courts apply Rule of Reason analysis.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1; Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
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discussion.40 The court was left to determine if the restraints were
reasonable under the appropriate § 1 analysis. 
1. Per Se Rule of Illegality
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon alleged that the NCAA and member
institutions had engaged in price-fixing by charging every recruit
the same price for educational and athletic opportunities.41 Histori-
cally, the Supreme Court “consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per
se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competi-
tive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to
eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.”42 In practical
terms, if parties agree to fix prices, they have violated the Sherman
Act; the Court will not conduct any further examination into their
motives or explanations.43 For analysis purposes, price-fixing does
not require the parties to agree to a rigid, uniform price.44 An agree-
ment to raise or lower prices, no matter what “machinery” was used,
is illegal.45 Although the per se analysis has historically been the
Court’s approach to handling price-fixing restraints, the Court has
slowly relaxed the assumption that all restraints that violate perfect
competition—such as price-fixing—are per se unreasonable and has
begun to apply the Rule of Reason analysis more frequently.46
2. Rule of Reason Analysis 
A restraint violates the Rule of Reason if its anticompetitive harm
is greater than its procompetitive benefits.47 Typically, courts rely
on a burden-shifting framework to conduct the Rule of Reason
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 988.
42. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
43. E.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
44. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part II.A.
47. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984) (analyzing
whether the NCAA’s procompetitive justification offsets the restraint’s anticompetitive harm);
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929
F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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analysis.48 In order to show a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant restrained trade in
the relevant market.49 The relevant market in § 1 cases includes
“notions of geography as well as product use, quality, and descrip-
tion.”50 The “outer boundaries” of a market are defined by the
interchangeability and price-elasticity of demand between the
product and its potential substitutes.51 The plaintiff must show that
the restraint produces actual negative effects in that market—the
mere existence of a restraint is insufficient evidence of harm.52
Showing anticompetitive effects establishes a prima facie antitrust
case.53 If the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the alleged conduct
restrains trade in the relevant market, the defendant has to prove
the restraint produces cognizable procompetitive benefits.54 On the
outside chance the case makes it this far,55 the court will then bal-
ance the restraint’s anticompetitive effects with its procompetitive
48. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1265, 1268 [hereinafter Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect] (finding that many courts
engage in a burden-shifting analysis before balancing a restraint’s procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009) (finding that the burden-shifting
framework has become even more popular since his earlier article). 
49. Some courts also require a showing of market power. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413
(holding ordinarily a plaintiff must show restraint in the relevant market and that the
defendant has enough control in the market to negatively affect competition). However, most
lower courts do not. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 101-05 (noting that a dwindling number of lower courts, led by the
Seventh Circuit, require a showing of market power and that instead showing that the
restraint actually restrains trade in the relevant market is sufficient). 
50. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063.
51. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon
Office Sols., 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008).
52. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (“Le-
gal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (holding that evidence that could be consistent with procom-
petitive and anticompetitive goals is not enough to support an inference of anticompetitive
conduct); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that plaintiff
must satisfy burden by showing actual anticompetitive effects).
53. Meese, supra note 49, at 100. 
54. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1986); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d
1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998); Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.
1997); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
55. Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect, supra note 48, at 1269 (stating that only 4 percent
of antitrust cases from 1977-1999 made it past the prima facie case).
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justifications.56 Finally, if the defendant can successfully show that
the restraint’s benefits outweigh its harms, the plaintiff has a
chance to show there are less restrictive means available to achieve
those benefits that are: (1) substantially less restrictive; (2) nearly
as effective in serving the procompetitive benefit; and (3) able to
achieve these effects without significantly increasing the defen-
dant’s costs.57 Even if the court determines that the restraint’s bene-
fits outweigh its harms, if the court also finds that there is a less
restrictive alternative, then the challenged restraint violates section
1 of the Sherman Act. 
3. Rule of Reason Analysis and Joint Ventures
A joint venture is one context where the Supreme Court has
recognized that restraints on trade may be reasonable, thus apply-
ing the Rule of Reason analysis as opposed to the per se approach.
Joint ventures necessarily involve agreement between members;
courts are therefore willing to give deference to restraints adopted
so the venture can exist, based on the theory that the presence of
some restraints is economically better than not having the joint
venture at all. The Court first treated joint ventures differently than
traditional businesses in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc.58 The Court held that “[j]oint ventures and
other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at
least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is
necessary to market the product at all.”59 The licenses in question
56. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir.
2010); Int’l Healthcare Mgmt. v. Haw. Coal. for Health, 332 F.3d 600, 607 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003);
Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2001); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond
Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 760-61 (2012). But see William Kolasky, Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement in the
United States: A Proposal, 22 ANTITRUST 85, 87 (2008) (noting that courts almost never
explicitly balance procompetitive and anticompetitive effects because the balancing occurs at
each step of the analysis); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The
Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 120 (1996) (stating courts often do
not explicitly balance procompetitive benefits but “scrutinize such an assertion by means of
a less restrictive alternative test”).
57. City of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); Law,
134 F.3d at 1019; Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679.
58. 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). 
59. Id.
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were not per se legal, but were at least subject to the Rule of Rea-
son.60
The Supreme Court applied the Broadcast Music decision to col-
legiate sports in the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma.61 The Board of Regents claimed that the
NCAA had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act with its television
contracts for broadcasting collegiate football games.62 The NCAA’s
four-year plan awarded CBS and ABC the exclusive right to nego-
tiate and contract to televise NCAA football.63 The plan included
stipulations about the maximum number of games that the net-
works could broadcast, appearance requirements, and appearance
limitations for each two-year period of the contract.64 Although the
broadcasting networks were allowed to negotiate directly with mem-
ber schools for the right to broadcast their games, the plan stipu-
lated the minimum amount the companies had to spend on all
broadcasts in a given year.65 The district court found that the min-
imum aggregate price operated “to preclude any price negotiation
between broadcasters and institutions.”66 
The district court held that the control the NCAA exercised “over
the televising of college football games violated the Sherman Act.”67
The court said, “the [NCAA] has established a uniform price for the
products of each of the member producers with no regard for the
differing quality of these products or the consumer demand for these
various products.”68 At the appellate level, the court of appeals held
“the television plan constituted illegal per se price-fixing.”69
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that price-fixing was “ordi-
narily condemned as a matter of law” under the per se approach.70
The Court, however, held that the per se rule was not applicable
because the case involved an industry in which some horizontal
60. Id. at 24-25.
61. 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). 
62. Id. at 88. 
63. Id. at 92. 
64. Id. at 94.
65. Id. at 93. 
66. Id. at 99-100.
67. Id. at 95. 
68. Id. at 96. 
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id. at 100.
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restraints on competition were essential to make the product avail-
able at all.71 The Court found that the NCAA and member institu-
tions market amateur athletics, and that the “integrity of the prod-
uct” could “not be preserved except by mutual agreement” between
member institutions to preserve this amateurism.72 By applying the
Rule of Reason, the Court extended Broadcast Music.73 According to
the Court, certain joint selling arrangements are so efficient that
they are actually procompetitive, and thus all restraints in those
ventures should be subject to the Rule of Reason.74 
Although the NCAA eventually lost in Board of Regents, the case
has largely acted to protect the NCAA from subsequent antitrust at-
tacks. First, any NCAA rule that restrained trade was thereafter
subject to the Rule of Reason analysis.75 Second, in his description
of why the NCAA might need rules that otherwise horizontally
restrain trade, Justice Stevens explained, “[i]n order to preserve the
character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of
the ‘product’ cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement.”76 In
his conclusion, Justice Stevens added that “[t]he NCAA plays a
critical role” in the preservation of amateur athletics, “that it needs
ample latitude” to do so, and that intercollegiate athletics are
consistent with the Sherman Act.77 Despite the fact that Justice
Stevens’s comments on compensation were mere dicta, the NCAA
and federal courts in subsequent cases interpreted those statements
to mean that NCAA bylaws are generally procompetitive, and that
the NCAA could legally restrain student-athlete compensation.78
71. Id. at 101. 
72. See id. at 102.
73. See id. at 103.
74. See id. at 103-04; see also 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1910d (3d ed. 2011)
(“In sum, in a situation involving a complex network joint venture where horizontal restraints
are necessary if the product is to be marketed ‘at all,’ every restraint created by that venture
qualifies for rule of reason treatment.”).
75. 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1910d.
76. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). 
77. Id. at 120.
78. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding Sherman Act applies
to NCAA bylaws, but that NCAA v. Board of Regents implies most are justifiable as fostering
amateur competition); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[M]ost of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA [are] a justifiable means of fostering competition among the
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Justice Stevens’s dicta and lower court decisions notwithstanding,
there is no per se rule of legality for NCAA restraints on compen-
sation, and Judge Wilken analyzed the restraints under the Rule of
Reason as the Board of Regents ruling necessitated. 
B. O’Bannon v. NCAA
This Section gives a brief introduction to the O’Bannon case, and
then analyzes the portion of the opinion relevant to the holding that
improved education quality is a procompetitive justification for the
restraint.79
1. Background
On July 21, 2009, twelve former NCAA Division I football and
men’s basketball student-athletes, led by former UCLA basketball
star Ed O’Bannon, filed an initial Complaint against the NCAA.80
The Complaint alleged that the NCAA violated federal antitrust law
“by engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy and a group boycott/refusal
to deal that has unlawfully foreclosed class members from receiving
compensation in connection with the commercial exploitation of
their images following their cessation of intercollegiate athletic
competition.”81 The plaintiffs brought the Complaint on behalf of all
current and former student-athletes.82 The original twelve former
athletes eventually added current student-athletes to the Complaint
as the court demanded.83 As the case evolved throughout the litiga
amateur athletic teams and therefore are procompetitive.” (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
at 117)); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343-45 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding NCAA eligibil-
ity rules limiting compensation reasonable (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102)); In re
NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(“The law is clear that athletes may not be ‘paid to play.’”); Roberts, supra note 34, at 2654
(stating that the NCAA argues preserving amateurism as a procompetitive justification
because the Supreme Court said so in NCAA v. Board of Regents).
79. The Ninth Circuit recently issued its ruling on the NCAA’s appeal of Judge Wilken’s
decision. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL 5712106 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
80. Class Action Complaint at paras. 1-2, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (No. C 09-3329 CW), 2009 WL 2416720.
81. Id.
82. Id. at para. 1.
83. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 1, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. C 09-01967
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tion process,84 the plaintiffs eventually sought to challenge NCAA
rules that prohibited current and former student-athletes from re-
ceiving a portion of the revenue created by the sale of their names,
images, and likenesses.85 The plaintiffs argued that these rules
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, and it was that charge that
Judge Wilken decided.86 
2. Relevant Portions of the O’Bannon Ruling 
Judge Wilken held that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence
to establish a national market where NCAA Division I schools sold
unique goods and services to football and men’s basketball
recruits.87 Because Division I football and men’s basketball schools
operated in a distinct market, Judge Wilken held that they had the
power to fix the price of their product.88 Under the challenged
restraints, the schools exercised that power by agreeing to charge
every recruit the same price for the educational and athletic oppor-
tunities they offered.89 According to Judge Wilken, this price-fixing
constituted a clear restraint on trade, and it did not matter that the
price-fixing agreement operated to undervalue the names, images,
and likenesses of the student-athletes as opposed to determining a
specific monetary price for their services.90 Judge Wilken further
held, in the alternative, that the NCAA and member institutions
could be considered buyers in a market for recruits’ athletic services
and licensing rights.91 As a result, the NCAA and member institu-
CW), 2013 WL 3810438. 
84. For a more in-depth analysis of the procedural history of this case, including its
consolidation with another NCAA right of publicity case, see Marc Edelman, The Future of
Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports,
92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1033-36 (2014).
85. See O’Bannon 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963; Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Com-
plaint, supra note 83 (alleging NCAA and member institutions engaged in a conspiracy to “fix
the amount current and former student-athletes are paid for the licensing, use, and sale of
their names, images, and likenesses at zero”).
86. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. 
87. Id. at 986-88.
88. Id. at 988.
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 989. 
91. Id. at 991. 
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tions had fixed prices among buyers, just as illegal a method of
price-fixing as price-fixing among sellers.92 
The NCAA raised four procompetitive justifications for the price-
fixing restraint: amateurism, competitive balance, integration of
academics and athletics, and increased output.93 Judge Wilken flatly
rejected the arguments that restraints on student-athlete compen-
sation increased competitive balance and output of collegiate
athletics.94 She did, however, hold that restraints on player compen-
sation might increase fan interest and may thus be considered
procompetitive.95 She held that fans associated college athletics with
amateurism, and increased fan interest might justify the challenged
restraints.96 Judge Wilken also noted that the challenged rules
might “facilitate the integration of academics and athletics by
preventing student-athletes from being cut off from the broader
campus community.”97 
3. Improved Academic Quality
This Note addresses the NCAA’s claim that restraining student-
athlete compensation helps promote the integration of academics
and athletics, and that doing so improves the quality of education
NCAA member institutions provide their student-athletes.98 The
NCAA alleged that student-athletes received short- and long-term
benefits from being student-athletes, and that student-athletes’
graduation rates showed the substantial benefit athletes received.99
Judge Wilken noted, however, that those benefits came from stu-
dent-athletes’ access to “financial aid, tutoring, academic support,
mentorship, structured schedules, and other educational services
that are unrelated to the challenged restraints in this case.”100 Those
92. Id. at 991-93.
93. Id. at 999. 
94. Id. at 1001-04. 
95. Id. at 1000-01.
96. Id. As indicated, this Note does not address Judge Wilken’s holding that amateurism
is a procompetitive justification.
97. Id. at 1003. 
98. Id. at 979.
99. Id. at 979-80.
100. Id. at 980. 
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benefits would still accrue as long as schools continued to provide
those services. 
The NCAA further alleged that the challenged restraint helped
integrate student-athletes into the student body as a whole, and
that paying them large sums of money would “create a wedge” be-
tween student-athletes and the other students and professors.101
The NCAA argued that, if compensated, student-athletes would
separate themselves from the campus and lose out on the benefit of
interacting with classmates and professors in an academic and
social setting, thus reducing the quality of their education.102 Again,
Judge Wilken held that the proffered benefit was better achieved
through restraints other than the ones at issue.103 Rules that
forbade member institutions from creating athlete-specific dorms
and rules that required student-athletes to attend class were better
at integrating student-athletes than restraints on compensation.104
Only towards the end of the section did Judge Wilken hold,
“Nonetheless, the Court finds that certain limited restrictions on
student-athlete compensation may help to integrate student-
athletes into the academic communities of their schools, which may
in turn improve the schools’ college education product.”
Later in the opinion, Judge Wilken again addressed improving ed-
ucation quality as a procompetitive justification for the restraint.105
Judge Wilken continued the discussion and analysis as though the
alleged procompetitive benefit did not justify the challenged
restraints.106 Despite all of the evidence the NCAA provided that
integrating student-athletes into the academic communities at their
school improved the educational “product” student-athletes receive,
Judge Wilken held to her determination that the challenged
restraints were irrelevant for those purposes.107 A ruling for the
plaintiffs on the issue seemed forthcoming when Judge Wilken
stated: 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1002-03.
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1003.
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[T]he NCAA has not shown that the specific restraints chal-
lenged in this case are necessary to achieve these benefits.
Indeed, student-athletes would receive many of the same
educational benefits described above regardless of whether or
not the NCAA permitted them to receive compensation for the
use of their names, images, and likenesses.108
She held that athlete integration was satisfied by requiring stu-
dent-athletes to attend class and maintain certain academic qualif-
ications, and that student-athlete academic success would continue
as long as schools continued to provide academic support.109 
Judge Wilken tempered her opinion, however, and held that some
limited restriction on student-athlete compensation may be needed
to prevent student-athletes from cutting themselves off from the
rest of campus.110 Ultimately, Judge Wilken issued an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the challenged restrictions, with caveats.
Schools could increase what they paid student-athletes each year,
up to the cost of attendance.111 Moreover, schools could put up
money in trust annually for each student-athlete, which they would
receive after leaving school, up to $5000 annually.112 These limita-
tions appear to be aimed at the narrow procompetitive benefit Judge
Wilken recognized.113 If student-athletes are paid only a few extra
thousand dollars a year in addition to their scholarships, that would
not be enough to cut them off from campus, according to Judge
Wilken’s logic. Additionally, any amount paid over that would be
held in trust and not accessible until after graduation, preventing
student-athletes from using the money while in school to separate
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (“As found above, the only way in which the challenged rules might facilitate the
integration of academics and athletics is by preventing student-athletes from being cut off
from the broader campus community. Limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation
may help schools achieve this narrow procompetitive goal.”).
111. Id. at 1007-08.
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1008. The injunction also did not prohibit the NCAA from enforcing rules that
would prevent the student-athlete from borrowing money against the amount held in trust.
Id. Judge Wilken stated the purpose for this was “to ensure the NCAA may achieve its goal
of integrating academics and athletics.” Id.
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themselves from campus.114 These were the less restrictive means
for obtaining the NCAA’s benefits without completely restraining
competition. 
II. PROCOMPETITIVE BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The analysis from here forward accepts the position that the
O’Bannon court was correct in determining the plaintiffs estab-
lished a prima facie Sherman Act section 1 case. The existence of
market power, a restraint, and anticompetitive effects of the re-
straint were well established. This Part analyzes what makes a
justification procompetitive, and compares that standard to Judge
Wilken’s decision to hold that improved educational quality is a
procompetitive benefit.
A. Procompetitive Framework
The goal of antitrust law is not to “condemn collaborations
producing socially desirable results.”115 The express language of
section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns “[e]very contract … in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”116  Every
single contract between parties restrains trade to some extent.117
In spite of the absolute language used in the statute, in each
antitrust case the court must determine whether the effects of a
contract “cause it to be a restraint of trade within the ‘intendment’
of the act.”118 The test of legality within the statute “is whether the
114. Id. Judge Wilken compared the amount held in trust to the value of a Pell Grant, a
stipend student-athletes in financial need may receive. Id. If there were no concerns about the
value of the Pell Grant, there should not be any about the $5000 held in trust. Id. 
115. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1504a. 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
117. United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (“[T]he act of Congress
must have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract
among business men that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon
interstate commerce, and possibly restrain it.” (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S.
578, 600 (1898))).
118. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911); see id. at 60 (“The statute
under this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts,
whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate
or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether
old or new, which would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint.” Id. at 60
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restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition.”119 As the court did in O’Bannon, courts apply-
ing the Rule of Reason consider the defendant’s claim that the al-
leged restraint serves a legitimate end and promotes competition.120
The issue that courts face, then, is determining what restraints
promote competition and are thus legitimate under the Act.121
The Court in Standard Oil—the case that established the Rule of
Reason122—stated that that the prohibition on unreasonable
restraints was aimed at preventing monopolies or monopoly-like
consequences.123 The consequences of monopolies are restricted out-
put, increased prices, or reduced product quality.124 These conse-
quences were deemed bad for the welfare of consumers and were
the primary aim of the Act.125 Economists and courts believed that
free markets were better for consumer welfare than markets in
which competitors had colluded, vertically or horizontally, to fix
price, output, or quality.126 From about 1940 to 1978, courts relied
on this economic paradigm, which led to what scholars have called
(emphasis added); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1982)
(“[A]s we have repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade.”).
119. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
120. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1504a; see supra notes 105-14 and accom-
panying text.
121. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1504a.
122. Meese, supra note 49, at 84.
123. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57.
124. Id. at 52; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 13 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that the monopolist produces at a
lower rate and charges a higher price than a perfect competitor would in the same market). 
125. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 7 (“My conclusion, drawn from the evidence in the Congressional Record, is that
Congress intended the courts to implement … only that value we would today call consumer
welfare.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (argu-
ing that monopolies are self-destructive in the long run and thus the negative impact of
monopolies reduces over time, but that the goal of antitrust is to speed up the process).
126. Meese, supra note 49, at 102. Meese argues that for decades, courts adopted an
economic paradigm called price theory, which rested upon several incorrect assumptions
—mainly that market transactions were costless, and as a result, nonstandard contracts had
no apparent efficiency purposes. Many nonstandard contracts, therefore, were held as
anticompetitive attempts to create, protect, or exercise monopoly power and were thus
unreasonable restraints on trade. Id. 
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antitrust’s “inhospitality tradition.”127 Belief in the unconstrained
market during this period led the Court to condemn many nonstan-
dard contracts as limiting competition regardless of their actual
effects, which may have been to improve competition.128 
Completely relying on the unconstrained free market to increase
consumer welfare, however, often results in market failure, defined
as an inefficient allocation of resources caused by transaction
costs.129 The idea that uninhibited, perfect competition will always
provide an efficient allocation of resources rests on assumptions of
perfect competition that do not hold true in reality.130 In the face
of transaction costs that cause market failures,131 inefficiencies can
be solved by contracts that would otherwise appear to be prima facie
anticompetitive.132 Economists commonly assume that nonstan-
dard contracts can reduce the cost of transacting, thus negating
the market failures that transaction costs create and improving
competition.133 Relying on markets in these situations would have
127. Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded
Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1291, 1322-23
(2013); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV.
705, 715 (1982) (“In [the inhospitality tradition] an inference of monopolization followed from
the courts’ inability to grasp how a practice might be consistent with substantial competi-
tion.”).
128. See supra notes 126-27; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972) (“[T]he Court has consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade are to
be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed to in-
crease competition.”). 
129. See Alan J. Meese, Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of
Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1783 (2006) (arguing that because transaction
costs exist in real life, relying on “unconstrained ‘spot’ markets to allocate resources will often
result in ‘market failure’—that is, an allocation of resources that is less than optimal”). 
130. See Easterbrook, supra note 125, at 1 (“[T]he picture of ‘perfect competition’ found in
economic texts, is a hypothetical construct.”); Meese, supra note 129, at 1783 (“[I]n the ‘real
world,’ without contractual integration, numerous assumptions of the perfect competition
model simply do not obtain.”); supra notes 126-27. 
131. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that there
would be no inefficient allocation of resources absent transaction costs because parties would
transact until they allocated resources efficiently).
132. See Meese, supra note 49, at 82; Meese, supra note 129, at 1784; see also Easterbrook,
supra note 125, at 4 (arguing that “cooperation is the source of monopoly,” but it “is also the
engine of efficiency”).
133. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of
Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 21, 40-41 (2005). 
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a negative impact on competition, and antitrust scholars recognize
that nonstandard contracts can actually be procompetitive.134
The Supreme Court has applied this principle in several cases—
NCAA v. Board of Regents,135 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.,136 and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.137—and has altered how it treats once per se unlawful
restraints.138 When the analysis of a restraint is centered on any
market inefficiencies the restraint might correct, there is no
distinction between a procompetitive justification and a restraint
that is reasonable.139 As soon as the defendant provides proof that
the restraint corrects a market failure, the restraint should be
deemed procompetitive because it moves market performance clos-
er to where it would be absent transaction costs.140 In other words,
the procompetitive conduct moves market performance closer to the
economic ideal. When restraints eliminate or mitigate a market
failure, the allocation of resources is more efficient than what a
“perfectly competitive” market would produce, improving consumer
134. Id. Note that rather than explicitly recognizing that nonstandard contracts can re-
duce market failure, most antitrust scholars recognize that principle by refraining from using
the per se analysis and arguing that non-standard contracts should be analyzed under the
Rule of Reason. Id. at 87-89.
135. 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (holding that some horizontal restraints would be necessary
to correct market inefficiency, namely that the product would not exist without the re-
straints). See generally Meese, supra note 133, at 28 (“The Court’s refusal to apply the per se
rule in NCAA seems to reflect a nascent recognition that some horizontal restrictions on
rivalry can overcome failures and thus enhance the results of overall competition.”). 
136. 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979) (stating that the horizontal restraint enhanced the total vol-
ume of the music that was sold and that the blanket license at issue substantially lowered
costs). The Court recognized a market failure when it said the restraints “made a market in
which individual composers are inherently unable to compete fully effectively.” Id. at 22-23.
See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 124 (“The blanket license arrangement [in BMI] saved
untold millions of dollars in transaction costs.”). 
137. 433 U.S. 36 (1978) (holding that manufacturer restrictions on dealer territories were
procompetitive because they reduced the market failure problem of free riding on advertising
expenditures of other dealers). 
138. See generally Meese, supra note 49, at 141-43; see also Richard D. Cudahy & Alan
Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 77 (2010) (“More recently, the Court has
explained the purpose of antitrust laws is to correct market failures.” (citing Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993))). 
139. See Meese, supra note 49, at 161-67 (“[T]here is no reason to weigh benefits against
anticompetitive harm, since the very existence of such benefits undermines any presumption
of harm.”). 
140. Id.
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welfare. The result is therefore reasonable under the policy of the
Sherman Act.
B. Product Quality and National Society of Professional
Engineers
The market failure alleged in O’Bannon is that left to their own
devices, schools would compete for student-athletes by compensat-
ing them for use of their names, images, and likenesses. The NCAA
claims this extra compensation would result in student-athletes
disassociating from the rest of campus, thus decreasing education
quality.141 The challenged restraints, then, prevent schools from
paying student-athletes, which in turn keeps athletes from separat-
ing themselves from campus and increases education quality.142 In
other words, unconstrained competition would reduce product qual-
ity. The Supreme Court’s decision in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States143 strongly suggests, however, that in-
creased product quality in this situation is not a procompetitive
justification for a restraint that otherwise violates the Sherman
Act.144 Engineers involved an agreement similar to the one at issue
in O’Bannon145 in that a horizontal agreement negated price compe-
tition among competitors.146 The National Society of Professional
Engineers (NSPE) agreed to refuse to negotiate or discuss the price
of its members’ work until after the client had chosen the engineer
to work on the job.147 The complaint alleged that this suppressed
price competition because customers had been deprived of free and
open competition.148 Rather than deny the agreement existed, the
141. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 979-81 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
142. Id. 
143. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
144. This is not to say that increased product quality is never a procompetitive benefit. See
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the Court in NCAA
v. Board of Regents recognized improved product quality as a procompetitive virtue when it
increases the public’s desire for the product). 
145. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
146. Compare Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 682-84 (noting that this was not a
specific price-fixing claim, but rather a refusal to negotiate that eliminated price competition),
with O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 991-98. Antitrust scholars state that this restraint looks
“very much like price fixing.” 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1504c.
147. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 682-83. 
148. Id. at 684. 
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NSPE raised the affirmative defense that the restraint had the pro-
competitive benefit of increasing engineering quality.149 The NSPE
alleged that competitive bidding pushed engineers to decrease their
prices to win bids, thus incentivizing them to decrease the quality
of their work in order to continually outbid their competition.150
The Court disagreed with the defendant’s argument that
increased product quality in this situation was a procompetitive
justification within the Sherman Act framework.151 The Court stated
that the Sherman Act “reflects a legislative judgment that ulti-
mately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also
better goods and services.”152 The policy is based on the assumption
that competition and the free market are the best methods of
allocating resources, and that the free market recognizes all
elements in a deal—quality, service, safety, and durability—in
addition to cost.153 The Court rejected the quality claim on grounds
it was illegitimate and inconsistent with the policy of the Sherman
Act.154 The Act “expresses great hostility, at least in the case of
serious restraints, to claimed benefits other than those that move
us closer to competitive results.”155 The purpose of all antitrust
analysis “is to form a judgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint.”156 To justify a restraint on the basis of a potential
threat to product quality and public safety would be “nothing less
than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”157
In Engineers, parties to the transaction could internalize the
decision about product quality and thus no restraint on trade was
needed to correct a market failure. The Court agreed that compet-
itive bidding might drive some engineers to produce a defective
product.158 The Court added, however, that a purchaser of engi-
neering services had the ability to conclude for itself that in the
149. Id. at 685.
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 694 (“[T]his Court has never accepted such an argument.”).
152. Id. at 695. 
153. Id.
154. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1504c.
155. Id.
156. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
157. Id. at 694-95.
158. Id. at 694.
698 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:675
interest of quality it would not pit bidders against each other.159
Additionally, the engineer could refrain from negotiating until it
was sure all of its customers’ required standards were met.160
Improved product quality would justify a restraint on trade so
long as the restraint corrected a market failure that was causing
reduced product quality in some way. Where there is no market
failure, actors cannot justify an otherwise unlawful restraint by
claiming it improves product quality. The Court has clearly held
that such a restraint restricts competition and is inconsistent with
the policy of the Sherman Act.
C. Engineers and Its Progeny
The Court has relied on its decision in Engineers in other situ-
ations involving horizontal restraints that limit competition. In FTC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD), dentists in the Federation
agreed to refuse to supply insurance companies with X-rays taken
of their patients.161 Insurance agencies, at the demand of policy-
holders, attempted to limit the cost of dental treatment by limiting
coverage to the “least expensive yet adequate treatment.”162 The
insurance agencies used X-rays to determine whether the treatment
the dentist pursued was appropriate.163 The Federation formed in
response to demands for the X-rays by insurance companies, and
promulgated a rule that forbade its members from submitting X-
rays to insurance agencies.164 The Court determined that there was
a restraint of trade, and that it had actual negative effects on the
competition between dentists.165 One of the Federation’s procompet-
itive justifications was that overturning the rule would have a
negative impact on the quality of dental care.166 The dentists argued
that X-rays alone were not enough to determine what treatment
should be pursued, and if insurance agencies relied on the X-rays,
159. Id. 
160. Id.; see also Meese, supra note 129, at 1788-89 (“[C]onsumers in a competitive market
could presumably perform their own assessment of any trade-off between price and quality.”). 
161. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 449-51 (1986). 
162. Id. at 449. 
163. Id.
164. Id. at 449-51.
165. Id. at 455-57.
166. Id. at 462. 
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they might decline to pay for treatment that the patients actually
needed, thus reducing the quality of care.167 
The Court expressly rejected this argument, invoking its decision
in Engineers.168 The Court stated, “[t]he argument is, in essence,
that an unrestrained market in which consumers are given access
to the information they believe to be relevant to their choices will
lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices.”169 Quoting
Engineers, the Court concluded that such an argument was a “fron-
tal assault” on Sherman Act policy.170 Absent the restraint, the
dentists in the Federation could make the determination about
service quality and the demands of their clients for themselves.171 If
clients wanted the cheapest care possible, dentists would respond
by providing the X-rays to the insurance companies. If clients
desired the best care possible, the dentists could refuse to turn over
the X-rays. The public safety (improved product quality) justifica-
tions in Engineers and IFD were based on the “faulty premise that
consumer choices made under competitive market conditions are
‘unwise’ or ‘dangerous,’” and the Court did not recognize them as
procompetitive justifications under the Sherman Act.172 
The Court again held that improved product quality is not a pro-
competitive justification in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n.173 In the case, court-appointed attorneys in Washington, D.C.,
boycotted taking new cases until they received a wage increase.174
The lawyers eventually received the desired wage increase, but the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint alleging that the
lawyers had violated the Sherman Act.175 The Administrative Law
Judge, the FTC, and the Court of Appeals all agreed that the
lawyers had restrained trade within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.176 The lawyers defended their position by arguing that
167. Id. at 462-63.
168. Id. at 463.
169. Id.
170. Id. 
171. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. 
172. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993).
173. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
174. Id. at 416-17.
175. Id. at 418-19. 
176. Id. at 422. 
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the increased wages would improve the quality of representation
provided to indigent defendants.177 
Just as the Court in Engineers conceded that reducing price com-
petition might increase the product quality, here the Court held that
increased wages may improve the quality of representation.178 The
Court, however, quoting Engineers, held that “the Sherman Act
reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”179
Quality, service, safety, and durability are all favorably improved by
the opportunity to select among different offers, which was no less
true for legal services than it was for engineering.180 
Restraints must correct a market failure in order to be considered
procompetitive. As these cases make clear, the Sherman Act em-
bodies the belief that competition is the best way for markets to
work efficiently. The belief that, given absolute information, con-
sumers will make poor decisions is not a market failure within the
Sherman Act. Courts are and should be concerned with situations
where market failures prevent efficient market operation, for exam-
ple when lack of information prevents informed decisions. This is
distinct from the concern that individuals with complete information
will make irrational decisions. 
III. PROCOMPETITIVE BENEFIT AND O’BANNON
A. Why Academic Integration Is Not a Procompetitive Justification
Judge Wilken’s focus on improved education quality as a procom-
petitive justification for the restraints on compensating student-
athletes for use of their names, images, and likenesses actually
appears to lean towards holding the restraints unreasonable and
generally unnecessary for the proffered justification.181 In reality,
she ruled the restraints were reasonable. Judge Wilken should have
ruled as her analysis indicated she would. The claim that restricting
student-athlete compensation increases product quality is substan-
177. Id. at 420. 
178. Id. at 423. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 423-24. 
181. See supra Part I.B.2.
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tively the same argument that the NSPE made in Engineers.182
Summarized, if the parties to the horizontal restraint were allowed
to compete, the quality of the product would deteriorate.183 This is
not enough to withstand antitrust scrutiny, either in Engineers or
in this case.184 
If restricting the level of compensation truly increases the quality
of education for student-athletes, member institutions would be free
to take that into consideration when determining how much aid to
provide, and student-athletes would be free to consider it when
deciding what school to attend.185 If a school known for its academic
standards, for example Stanford University or Duke University,
thought their education product was truly better without compen-
sating student-athletes for use of their names, images, or likenesses,
they could choose not to provide such compensation. Other institu-
tions might choose the opposite strategy and decide that the effect
on education quality caused by not paying student-athletes is mini-
mal, and consequently choose to compensate student-athletes for
use of their names, images, and likenesses. This second group of
schools would have come to a different conclusion than the first:
student-athletes, even if they value a quality education, do not find
the increase in education quality worth forfeiting the right to ad-
ditional compensation. Neither of these decisions is wrong, or
correct for that matter, but absent the challenged restraints, the
universities could make that decision for themselves and allocate
their resources in a way they best see fit to provide the educational
and athletic opportunities student-athletes desire. The Court in
Engineers said that “an individual vendor might independently re-
frain from price negotiation until he has satisfied himself that he
fully understands the scope of his customers’ needs.”186 No different
182. Compare Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 685 (1978) (over-
ruling engineers’ arguments that their restraint was reasonable because it increased the qual-
ity of the good produced), with O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(reciting the NCAA’s argument that paying student-athletes large sums of money could result
in their separation from campus and thus reduce the quality of their education).
183. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 685.
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. This statement, and the argument that follows, uses the same reasoning the Court
used in Engineers. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695. If quality of product mat-
tered to the engineers’ customers, the consumer could have considered that when deciding to
take competing bids. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
186. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 694.
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here is the schools’ ability to determine what its customers, poten-
tial student-athletes, want.
That is to say nothing of the student-athletes’ ability to make
this distinction when deciding what school to attend. One student-
athlete might value the best education he can receive, which might
include attending a university that does not compensate him beyond
his scholarship. Another student-athlete might decide that the
decreased quality of education caused by being paid is offset by the
opportunity to earn money for use of his name, image, and likeness.
Further, the NCAA’s argument hinges on the fact that student-
athletes might separate themselves from campus and, as a result,
hurt their education.187 That requires that the student-athlete ac-
tually separate himself from campus before his education suffers.188
A student-athlete may well value both an education and the oppor-
tunity to earn extra money. Even if separating from campus does
negatively impact education, these goals are not mutually exclusive.
A student-athlete who feels this way could choose to attend a
reputable academic institution that also pays its student-athletes
for use of their names, images, and likenesses, and then refuse to
separate from campus knowing full well the negative consequences
of doing so. 
Given our definition of a procompetitive benefit,189 there is no
market failure here that the restraint on trade corrects. Education
quality may improve when student-athletes are not compensated
for use of their names, images, or likenesses, but the parties to the
transaction are capable of considering all necessary effects of the ad-
ditional compensation when transacting. Improved product quality
alone is not enough of a justification for the restraint, as long as the
parties to the transaction internalize the effects of their decision.
There is no reason to believe student-athletes and universities
cannot do so here without the challenged restraints. There is no
187. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (reciting the NCAA’s argument that student-
athletes who make a large sum of money might be inclined to separate themselves from the
broader campus community).
188. Nothing in the NCAA’s argument about education quality seems to indicate that
making money in and of itself reduces the quality of student-athletes’ education. Id. at 979-81.
In fact, no NCAA witness could articulate why paying student-athletes would be any more of
an issue than it is for students who come from affluent backgrounds or for students paid to
work at the university. Id. at 980.
189. See supra Part II.A.
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market failure to correct, so the restrictions do not move the parties
closer to competitive results any more than the restraints in Engi-
neers and its progeny did. Consequently, the alleged procompetitive
justification is inconsistent with Sherman Act policy. 
B. Brown University
This is not the first time academic institutions have raised this
procompetitive benefit. In United States v. Brown University, the
Third Circuit dealt with what was called the “Ivy Overlap Group.”190
The Ivy League schools, plus MIT, eliminated price competition for
students by agreeing to give only need-based financial aid, agreeing
on the formula for determining the amount of need-based aid to
give, and agreeing to give all commonly admitted students the same
amount of need-based aid.191 When challenged under § 1, one of the
procompetitive justifications the Overlap Group gave for their
agreement was that it allowed a more socioeconomically diverse set
of students to be admitted, which improved the education students
at these schools received.192 At the trial level, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that
although a diverse student body may improve education quality, the
Overlap Group did not need to restrain trade to achieve this
benefit.193 The court explicitly invoked Engineers and IFD in its
decision.194 There was no reason, in the district court’s opinion, to
believe that if such a benefit actually existed, the members of the
Overlap Group would not continue to give need-based aid to stu-
dents who would improve the quality of education at their schools
of their own accord.195 The district court concluded, “[i]f MIT and the
other Ivy League schools were to so easily abandon these objectives
merely because Overlap was not in play, then the court could con-
clude only that their professed dedication to these ends was less
than sincere.”196 
190. 5 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Brown University II].
191. Id.
192. Id. at 674. 
193. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 306-07.
196. Id. at 307. 
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On appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the case for further Rule
of Reason analysis on the grounds that the district court did not
consider in its market analysis the effects of the restraint.197
Although past cases, Engineers being one, indicated a full market
analysis might not always be necessary, the court held that the fact
that the Overlap Group dealt with higher education might justify
different treatment than in other contexts.198 The circuit court also
held that Engineers and IFD might be distinguished on grounds
that the Overlap Group allegedly provided some consumers with
additional choices that a free market would deny them.199 
Relying on the Third Circuit’s opinion in Brown University to
counter this Note’s argument is unpersuasive for a number of rea-
sons. First, the Third Circuit did not actually say how the case
should be decided.200 The court simply held the case should be re-
manded for a full Rule of Reason analysis.201 Second, the restraints
never underwent a full Rule of Reason analysis.202 Congress inter-
vened on the schools’ behalf, and passed an act that permitted the
Overlap Group to continue to restrict financial aid to need-based
scholarships before any Rule of Reason analysis could take place.203 
Further, and most importantly, it is not entirely clear why the
market for higher education should be treated any differently than
a typical market. This is especially true given that the Third Circuit
devoted three pages of its opinion to determining that giving fi-
nancial aid was a commercial transaction.204 The Third Circuit
197. Brown University II, 5 F.3d at 678. 
198. Id. (“The nature of higher education, and the asserted procompetitive and pro-
consumer features of the Overlap, convince us that a full rule of reason analysis is in order
here.”).
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 677-78 (holding that the Overlap Group “may in fact merely regulate compe-
tition in order to enhance it,” and that it “may be that institutions of higher education” require
a practice that would violate the Sherman Act in other contexts) (emphasis added). 
201. Id. at 678 (“Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district court with instruc-
tions to evaluate Overlap using the full-scale rule of reason analysis outlined above.”). 
202. Elizabeth T. Bangs, MIT Settlement Won’t Save Overlap, HARV. CRIMSON (June
9, 1994), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1994/6/9/mit-settlement-wont-save-overlap-pdid
[http://perma.cc/6JQK-MZJV] (discussing details of the DOJ and MIT Overlap Group settle-
ment in 1993). 
203. Improving America’s School Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 568, 108 Stat. 3518,
4060 (exempting institutions of higher education from antitrust law when agreeing to
award financial aid). 
204. Brown University II, 5 F.3d at 665-68.
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potentially accepted improved product quality as a procompetitive
justification, a decision inherently at odds with substantial Supreme
Court precedent.205 There is no reason, on remand, that the district
court would have found that colluding on the way financial aid was
distributed was necessary to fix a market failure. If schools truly
benefit from a diverse student body, they would continue to grant
need-based aid to a socioeconomically diverse set of students.206 This
was not a benefit, or ill-defined property right, that the parties to
the transactions failed to internalize. Students benefit from going
to a socioeconomically diverse school, and the school provides a
better product by admitting a wide range of diverse students. In the
case at hand, the NCAA alleged that student-athlete integration
would improve the product quality that student-athletes received,
which requires assuming universities and student-athletes would
make unwise decisions in a competitive market.207 This is an as-
sumption that is inconsistent with Sherman Act policy for the rea-
sons argued above.208 The Supreme Court simply has not recognized
the use of noncompetition to enhance procompetitive benefits.209 If
better bridges, better health care, or better legal services for the
indigent do not justify a restraint, it seems a stretch to say the
Court would hold otherwise for education quality.210 
C. Illusory Benefit
Even assuming that this restraint serves a procompetitive benefit
and negates a market failure, it is not clear that the alleged benefit
even exists. When a defendant justifies a restraint with a theoreti-
cal procompetitive benefit, the plaintiff still has the opportunity to
show that the benefit is nonexistent.211 If athletes cutting them
205. See supra Parts II.B-C. 
206. This is the exact conclusion the district court came to the first time. See United States
v. Brown University, 805 F. Supp. 288, 306-07 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. See supra Part II.
209. See supra Part II.
210. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust
Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 364 (2000) (arguing that the Third
Circuit’s holding in Brown University was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in
Engineers, NCAA v. Board of Regents, IFD, and Superior Court Trial Lawyers). 
211. See Meese, supra note 49, at 161-67 (arguing that even though proof of a
procompetitive benefit negates the need to balance any anticompetitive harm, the plaintiff
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selves off from campus is bad for education quality, it necessarily
follows that athletes being separated from campus for any reason is
bad for education quality. In the O’Bannon opinion, Judge Wilken
noted how Ed O’Bannon testified that he felt like he was “an athlete
masquerading as a student.”212 Innumerable examples exist that
show how secluded student-athletes already are from the broader
student body and not entirely of their own accord. 
For instance, the NCAA’s own rules permit institutions to pro-
vide meals to student-athletes as a part of training tables.213 This
allows student-athletes to separate themselves from campus at a
time when student interaction is at a peak: during evening meals.
Presumably, even if compensated for use of their names, images,
and likenesses, student-athletes would have to continue going to
class.214 The real concern, then, seems to be that student-athletes
will separate themselves socially from other students, harming their
all-around college experience.215 Even assuming that this is a valid
concern, the NCAA’s bylaws already allow institutions to separate
student-athletes from the campus as a whole. This indicates that
the benefit for which the NCAA is allegedly fighting does not exist
in the first place. 
Individual universities also allow student-athletes to separate
themselves from the broader campus community. In 2013, Oregon
opened a 145,000 square foot training facility for the football pro-
gram.216 In addition to athletic equipment upgrades, the facility
includes player lounges, game rooms, a cafeteria, and the players’
own barbershop.217 It is hard to imagine a student-athlete more cut
off from the general student body than one who has the opportunity
to eat, relax, entertain, train, and get his hair cut in a place that is
should still have the opportunity to show that any alleged benefit is “illusory”).
212. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
213. 2014-2015 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 15.2.2, 15.2.2.1.5. 
214. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980-81 (stating that the benefits student-athletes get from
student and professor interaction are mostly fulfilled by the NCAA’s academic requirements).
This would continue to be the case unless the NCAA altered those rules as well. 
215. Id. at 980 (“These administrators noted that … [s]tudent-athletes might also be in-
clined to separate themselves from the broader campus community by living and socializing
off campus.”). 
216. See John W. McDonough, Oregon’s Football Facility: Behind the Scenes, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2013), http://www.si.com/college-football/photos/2013/07/31/university-
oregon-athletic-facility-behind-scenes#1 [http://perma.cc/Y77C-LRSQ].
217. Id. 
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limited to the football team. This type of facility is not exclusive
to Oregon; in 2013, the University of Alabama, a college football
powerhouse, unveiled a new training facility that includes a nutri-
tion center, player lounges, and an arcade.218 Other universities are
spending millions of dollars on similar facilities.219 
The most anomalous contradiction between what the NCAA
says it wants to do—integrate student-athletes into the broader
campus—and what it actually does, is the way the NCAA and its
athletic conferences maximize profit. For the most recently avail-
able data, the 2011-2012 fiscal year, the NCAA made $871.6 million
in revenue.220 About 81 percent of that revenue came from broad-
casting rights the NCAA sold to television networks.221 In 2010 the
NCAA signed a fourteen-year, $10.8 billion deal with CBS/Turner
Broadcasting for the rights to the NCAA Division I men’s basketball
tournament.222 In late 2012, ESPN agreed to pay the NCAA $470
million annually over a twelve-year period for the right to broadcast
the new NCAA College Football Playoff.223 That deal was in addition
to a deal the NCAA and ESPN agreed to in late 2011.224 The 2011
deal was worth $500 million over twelve years, and includes the
right to broadcast twenty-four NCAA championships and over 600
hours of live telecasts.225 Individual NCAA athletic conferences also
have television contracts that are worth billions of dollars over the
lifetime of the agreements.226 
218. Andrew Kulha, How Alabama’s New Facility Compares to Oregon’s New Football
Performance Center, BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/17242
84-how-alabamas-new-facility-compares-to-oregons-new-football-performance-center [http://
perma.cc/U3CY-NXEL]. 
219. Jordan Zirm, 17 Insanely Expensive College Athletic Training Facilities, STACK
(June 2, 2014), http://www.stack.com/2014/06/02/expensive-college-athletic-training-facilities
[http://perma.cc/3WXA-RJ84]. 
220. See Revenue, supra note 9.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Rachel Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
21, 2012, 1:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324851704578133223970
790516 [http://perma.cc/2QPV-D2UH].
224. Lucas Shaw, ESPN, NCAA Extend Deal Through 2023-24, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2011,
6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/15/us-espn-ncaa-idUSTRE7BE2FM2011
1215 [http://perma.cc/W6YN-Z7NE].
225. Id.
226. Andrew Carter, ACC, ESPN Agree on $3.6 Billion TV Rights Deal, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(May 10, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-05-10/sports/sns-mct-acc-espn-agree-
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The issue with these broadcasting agreements is that they re-
quire the NCAA to make athletic events available throughout the
week so the broadcasting companies have games to televise. In
2014, ESPN networks aired more regular season college baseball
games than they ever had before.227 The Southeastern Conference
(SEC) had a special broadcast on Thursdays and the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC) had a broadcast spot on Mondays.228 Historically,
college baseball series were played on Friday evening, Saturday,
and Sunday. The result of these television deals is that games are
being moved around and played midweek, causing student-athletes
to miss significant amounts of class. ESPN airs ACC basketball
games on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays.229 Mid-major Di-
vision I football programs are often forced to play games midweek,
during less favorable time slots, in order to increase the value of
their television deals.230 
Some of the biggest scheduling issues occur with the Division I
men’s basketball conference tournaments and NCAA tournament.
Conference tournaments typically take place in the early part of
March at neutral sites and involve games throughout the day start-
on-3.6-billion-tv-rights-deal-20120510_1_acc-espn-contract [http://perma.cc/Y2AF-KYC2] (re-
porting ACC and ESPN broadcasting agreement through 2026-2027 for $3.6 billion); Brett
McMurphy, Big 12 Strikes New Media Deal, ESPN (Sept. 7, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://espn.go.
com/college-sports/story/_/id/8346345/big-12-announces-media-deal-abc-espn-fox [http://perma.
cc/5K9J-JS6Q] (announcing Big 12 media deal with ESPN and Fox for thirteen years and $2.6
billion); Pac-10 Announces ESPN/Fox TV Deal, ESPN (May 4, 2011, 8:04 PM), http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6471380 [http://perma.cc/6MZA-E23H] (announcing Pac-10
media deal with ESPN and Fox for twelve years and $2.7 billion).
227. Michael Humes, ESPN Networks to Air Most Regular-Season College Baseball Games
Ever, ESPN MEDIAZONE (Feb. 6, 2014), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2014/02/
espn-networks-air-regular-season-college-baseball-games-ever [http://perma.cc/SDE3-EMP5].
228. Id.
229. ACC’s 2014 ESPN Television Schedule, ESPN (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://espn.go.
com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/87563/accs-2014-espn-television-schedule [http://
perma.cc/BJE8-RXDF].
230. See Connor Tapp, Wednesday’s College Football Schedule: Game Times, TV Coverage
for Week 12 MACtion, SB NATION (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2013/11/13/5088964/college-football-2013-schedule-week-12-Wednesday [http://perma.
cc/2Z9E-7JJC] (discussing MAC football games taking place on Wednesday nights); Bryan M.
Vance, The New MAC-ESPN TV Deal Explained, SB NATION (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://
www.hustlebelt.com/2014/8/19/6045303/explaining-the-new-mac-espn-tv-deal [http://perma.cc/
8KKF-2NAV] (discussing the new MAC-ESPN television deal). 
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ing on Wednesday and culminating on Sunday.231 Some conference
tournaments start as early as Tuesday, and run the duration of the
week.232 The 2014 NCAA tournament, for which CBS and Turner
Sports paid $10.8 billion over fourteen years for the right to broad-
cast,233 involved games played across the nation on a Tuesday,
multiple Wednesdays, multiple Thursdays, and multiple Fridays.234
Marc Edelman, law professor at Zicklin School of Business, Baruch
College, reported that the Syracuse University men’s basketball
team would miss nearly 25 percent of their second semester classes
if they made it to the NCAA Championship game.235 The article was
written in direct response to Syracuse head basketball coach Jim
Boeheim’s comment that it would be “idiotic” to pay student-athletes
because of the free education they receive.236 Syracuse ended up
making it to the Final Four but not the Championship game, mean-
ing they missed “only” about 20 percent of their scheduled classes.237
Even that is a far cry from the education a typical college student
receives. Boeheim’s stand for amateurism and the typical education-
based compensation comes off as even more insincere and hypocriti-
cal in light of Syracuse’s recent NCAA sanctions, some of the stiffest
ever levied, for academic fraud and illicit booster payments to men’s
basketball players.238 
231. See Troy Machir, College Basketball Conference Tournaments: TV Schedule, Sites,
Dates and Times, SPORTING NEWS, http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/story/2014-
02-26/college-basketball-conference-tournaments-schedules-tv-information-times-dates [http://
perma.cc/9PJ5-4E6D] (last updated Mar. 16, 2014).
232. Id. 
233. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
234. 2014 NCAA Tournament Schedule, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2014), http://espn.go.com/mens-
collegebasketball/story/_/id/9258206/2014-ncaa-tournament-schedule-key-dates [http://perma.
cc/K72M-5uQR].
235. Marc Edelman, Syracuse's Road to the 2014 NCAA Men's Basketball Championship
Would Likely Cost Players 17 Days of Class; 24.2% of Overall Semester, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/01/07/syracuses-road-to-the-mens-basketball-
championship-would-cost-players-17-days-of-class-24-2-of-overall-semester [http://perma.cc/
37JV-BCW3].
236. Id. 
237. Mike Waters, Syracuse Basketball's Run Ends at Final Four Against Michigan,
SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.syracuse.com/orangebasketball/index.ssf/2013/04/
final_four_2013_syracuse_vs_mi_9.html [http://perma.cc/G7CG-RSH6].
238. Ricky O’Donnell, Everything You Need to Know About Syracuse’s NCAA Scandal,
SB NATION (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2015/3/9/8166543/
syracuse-ncaa-scandal-explained-jim-boeheim [http://perma.cc/ZA8B-6MA6].
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The NCAA has offered the procompetitive justification of in-
creased education quality by integrating athletics and academics.239
Student-athletes are already missing extraordinary amounts of
class and spending significant time away from the rest of the stu-
dent body. Even if a court were to hold that improving education
quality is a procompetitive benefit, a challenger could likely show
the benefits are illusory. Student-athletes have schedules, responsi-
bilities, and opportunities that cut them off from the general
student body. Not paying them for use of their names, images, and
likenesses cannot somehow create a benefit that does not exist in
the first place. 
CONCLUSION: THE NCAA MOVING FORWARD
Even if the NCAA were to accept this Note’s argument as true,
the debate over compensating student-athletes would not be over.
Judge Wilken also held that increased fan interest in collegiate
sports was a procompetitive justification for the restraint.240 If that
portion of the court’s holding is accepted as true, the justification
would also warrant holding the restraints reasonable under section
1 of the Sherman Act.241 
This Note, however, is not simply an esoteric analysis of one type
of alleged procompetitive benefit. The NCAA has historically re-
ceived favorable treatment under antitrust law.242 That status is
being challenged, and continues to be so even after the O’Bannon
decision. In August 2014, after the O’Bannon case had been decided,
antitrust lawyer Jeffrey Kessler filed suit against the NCAA claim-
ing that he wanted to take down the cartel controlling college sports
and get rid of any rules against paying college athletes.243 A New
York Times report on the lawsuit said that “while the N.C.A.A. has
shown an inclination to tiptoe toward significant change, Kessler’s
case takes a bazooka to the entire model of college athletics.”244
239. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
240. Id.; see supra note 34.
241. See supra Part I.A.3.
242. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
243. Steve Eder, A Legal Titan of Sports Labor Disputes Sets His Sights on the NCAA, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/sports/jeffrey-kessler-envisions-
open-market-for-ncaa-college-athletes.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/YAT6-MGQ8].
244. Id.
2015] NCAA AND THE RULE OF REASON 711
Kessler, one of the lawyers who helped negotiate the free-agency
systems in the National Football League and National Basketball
Association, aims to knock out all restrictions on student-athlete
compensation and allow the free market to determine their worth.245
Two other NCAA antitrust litigation cases are ongoing. In 2012,
Gardner-Webb University quarterback John Rock filed an antitrust
lawsuit against the NCAA, alleging that it violated antitrust law
with the old rule that forbade colleges from guaranteeing scholar-
ships for more than a year.246 Under the old rule, changed in 2012,
colleges were only permitted to grant one year scholarships.247 Each
year, then, the college had the ability to renew or revoke each play-
er’s scholarship.248 In 2013, the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, and the
case remains ongoing.249 The second pending antitrust case was
brought by Shawne Alston, former West Virginia University
running back, for violation of antitrust law relating to the restricted
value of athletic scholarships.250 The lawsuit alleges an antitrust
violation, but the legal arguments are different than those in the
O’Bannon case.251 As opposed to O’Bannon, which limited its attack
to compensation for use of players’ names, images, and likenesses,
this case asserts broader violations related to compensation limits
in general.252 According to sports law professor Michael McCann,
the case is particularly worth paying attention to because it could
create a circuit split.253 The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon sided with
the players.254 If the NCAA were to win in the Seventh Circuit,
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where the Alston case sits, there would be a circuit split, making it
significantly more likely that the Supreme Court would grant certio-
rari.255 
Even though Judge Wilken’s ruling upheld the restraint to a cer-
tain degree, the decision still struck a blow to the NCAA’s antitrust
protection.256 As that protection is challenged further, the O’Bannon
decision and subsequent legal analyses like this Note leave the
NCAA increasingly vulnerable to having its bylaws that restrict
student-athlete compensation overturned as antitrust violations.
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